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Article 5

COMMENTS
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN THE RECENT
PASSPORT CASES
By BILL L. HOISINGTON*

Introduction
The increasing interest in international affairs has not been restricted
to those in the national government who have been charged with the nation's defense from foreign aggression. Daily more and more private citizens are deciding that their economic well-being and personal happiness
depend upon their moving about the world and dealing with foreign persons
and institutions. And to these citizens the regulation of their movements
abroad is another aspect of the ancient struggle between the individuals of
a country and their government.
To those who have found themselves at the hub of the present-day
expression of that aged battle for personal liberty, resolution of that conflict is of prime importance. But, although an understanding of the nature
of the conflict is of considerable importance here, this discussion does not
seek to resolve that particular problem.
The central concern of the considerations which follow is much narrower. The center of focus is the power to restrictthe foreign travel of citizens, its location in the federal government, and its characteristics. Problems involving the exercise of that power are certainly important, but they
do not constitute the main theme of interest.
Nevertheless, before the power can be advantageously discussed as
such, a proper perspective must be laid by reference to a factual situation
in which it was intimately involved.
A Problem for the Courts
In March of 1954, Mr. Weldon F. Dayton applied for a passport to
enable him to travel lawfully to India where he was to accept a position as
research physicist at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. The
Director of the Passport Office informed him that his application was denied
because ". . . it would be contrary to the best interests of the United States
to provide you passport facilities at this time."' Mr. Dayton, upon request,
executed an affidavit stating that he was not then and never had been a
Communist.' After a second denial, Mr. Dayton filed an appeal to the Board
of Passport Appeals.3 The Board, after a hearing, submitted its recommen* Member, Second-Year Class.
'Quoted in Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144, 145 (1958).
The affidavit may be required under 22 C.F.R. § 51.142. See note 6 infra.

2

3 22 C.F.R. § 51.138 (1952)

provides: "In the event of a decision adverse to the applicant,

he shall be entitled to appeal his case to the Board of Passport Appeals provided for in § 51.139."
22 C.F.R. § 51.139 (1952) provides in substance for a Board composed of three officers of the

Department of State designated by the Secretary of State. The Board makes its own rules and
the applicant is accorded the right to inspect the transcript of his own testimony and to be
represented by counsel.
[290 ]
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dation to the Secretary of State who, after reviewing the testimony and
evidence brought forth at the hearing and a confidential file of investigative reports (which the Board had examined but which the petitioner had
not 4), denied the application.
In April of 1955, Dr. Walter Briehl, a psychiatrist, applied for a passport to attend an International Psychoanalytic Congress in Geneva and a
World Mental Health Organization Congress in Istanbul. Dr. Briehl flatly
refused to submit any affidavit concerning membership in the Communist
Party and as a result the Director disapproved the application stating: "In
your case it has been alleged that you were a Communist. ' 5 Dr. Briehl persisted in his refusal to submit the affidavit saying that his past beliefs and
associations were immaterial to his right to a passport.6 The Board refused
to entertain any appeal until he complied with the Passport Division's
request."
Beginning in August of that same year, similar events occurred with
respect to the application of Mr. Rockwell Kent for a passport to visit
England and to attend the "World Council of Peace" in Helsinki, Finland.
Mr. Kent also refused to submit an affidavit concerning Communist Party
membership and his application was denied for reasons similar to those
given Dr. Briehl.
Mr. Kent and Dr. Briehl sued separately in the District Court for the
District of Columbia for declaratory relief. Both cases were summarily dismissed. The Court of Appeals heard the two cases en banc and affirmed by
a divided vote.' Meanwhile, Mr. Dayton had suffered corresponding misfortune after lengthy and complicated legal proceedings.' Certiorari to the
Supreme Court was granted all three cases in early 1958.10
On June 16, 1958 the decisions of the Court of Appeals were reversed.,'
The passports were issued. In so acting, the Court placed new landmarks
422 C.F.R. § 51.163 (1954) provides, inter alia:
"... . The Board shall conduct the hearing proceedings in such manner as to protect from
disclosure information affecting the national security or tending to disclose or compromise
investigative sources or methods."
5
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 119 (1958), quoting the Director.
6 22 C.F.R. § 51.142 (1952) provides:
1... [T]he applicant may be required, as a part of his application, to subscribe, under
oath or affirmation, to a statement with respect to present or past membership in the Communist Party. If the applicant states that he is a Communist, refusal of the passport in his case
will be without further proceedings."
7 22 C.F.R. § 51.156 (1954) provides that prior to petition for an appeal, an applicant shall
comply with section 51.142 if the provisions of that section have been deemed necessary by the
Passport Office.
8 248 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
9 Dayton v. Dulles, 237 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (reversing the district court's summary
judgment for the Secretary and remanding to him for disclosure of the basis of his decision).
See "Decision and Findings ...." attached as appendix to 357 U.S. 144, 150-54 (1958) for the
compliance by the Secretary. Then see Dayton v. Dulles, 254 F.2d 71 (D.C. Cir. 1957), affirming
146 F. Supp. 876 (D.D.C. 1956) (second summary judgment for the Secretary after his compliance).
10 355 U.S. 911 (1958); 355 U.S. 881 (1958).
11357 U.S. 144 (1958); 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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in a struggle which was raging full-blown at the time of the Magna Carta
but which, until recently, was seldom felt in this country. The historical
perspective of this problem is essential to any rational understanding of it.
HistoricalBackground: The Passportand the Right to Travel
Next to personal security, the law of England regards ... the personal

liberty of the individual. This personal liberty consists in the power of
locomotion, of changing situation, or moving one's person to whatsoever
place one's own inclinations may direct without imprisonment or restraint,
[I] t is a right strictly natural; ... it cannot

unless by due course of law ....

be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit2
-Blackstone1
permission of the laws.
The Magna Carta, as signed by John Lackland at Runnymeade in 1215,
deprived the King of the right to prevent his subjects from traveling in or
out of the country. But John died very shortly afterward and William
Marshall, regent for young Henry III, republished the charter without
these particular guarantees except as regards the travel of merchants. Immediately after that time the English Kings often exercised control of
citizens' travel abroad, usually through the issuance of a writ Ne Exeat
Regnum. 3 Gradually, however, the use of the writ was more and more limited to equity cases.' 4 And because of the writ's limited use by the middle
of the Eighteenth Century, it was commonly assumed that the right to
travel about from nation to nation knew few formal restrictions and those
only in extraordinary circumstances.'
It is little wonder then that the Constitution is silent on the specific
matter of foreign travel restrictions. The "due process" clause of the fifth
amendment expounds the basic limitation upon any exercise of governmental authority which deprives the citizen of "life, liberty, or property."
Still, if there is a power which may, with "due process," deprive a citizen
of his liberty with respect to foreign travel, the Constitution is not explicit
on where it resides.
The freedom to travel between the several states was early recognized
as a sacred constitutional guarantee. 6 But the right to travel outside the
United States did not receive the benefit of such consecration until quite
recently. The reason for that delay was that the right to travel freely
12 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*134.

13 See generally, Note, 41 GEO. L.J. 63, 64-70 (1952). BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed.
1951) gives, in part, on Ne Exeat Regno: ". . . It was formerly used for political purposes,
but is now only resorted to in equity when the defendant is about to leave the kingdom; ... "
See also id., Ne Exeat Republica; note 61 infra.
14 See Note, 41 GEo. L.J. 63, 69-70 (1952). See also discussions in 38 Am. JUR. Ne Exeat
§§1-6 (1941) and 65 C.J.S. Ne Exeat § 1 (1950).
15 See Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 CoLuM. L. Rav. 47, 48 (1956);
Parker, The Right to Go Abroad: To Have and to Hold a Passport,40 VA. L. REv. 853, 866-67
(1954).
16 Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 445, 749 (1868). See generally Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S.
270, 274 (1900).
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abroad, except in times of war, was seldom denied a citizen of this country
prior to 1953. Such restrictions or hindrances to free travel as have been
forthcoming have usually taken the form of a denial of the right to a passport. And such a denial might or might not have had the effect of conclusively precluding lawful travel abroad depending upon whether a passport
was, at the time of denial, an essential prerequisite of lawful exit and entrance. It will be seen that passports were not prerequisite to lawful travel
throughout most of this nation's history.
Attitude of Courts and Congress to 1939
In 1803 Congress prohibited issuance of a passport to an alien which
certified him to be a citizen.17 During the War of 1812, it became unlawful
for a citizen to cross the frontier into enemy territory without a passport
issued by the Secretary of State or other designated official.' 8
In 1835 the Supreme Court declared that a passport was not admissible
as evidence of citizenship. 9 The Court declared that a passport was a mere
request to a foreign power that the bearer pass safely and freely. The Court
said further that the issuance of a passport was entirely within the discretionary power of the Secretary of State. But as an indication of the "looseness" of the passport issuing procedure at that time, the court alluded to
the fact that the Secretary had made no inquiry to ascertain the fact of
citizenship."0
Congress enacted the nation's basic passport statute in 18561 Its sole
restrictive aspect was that only the Secretary of State was empowered to
issue such a document. Ten years later Congress provided that passports
might only be issued to citizens, 2 and no other categories of eligibility were
then established.
There followed some fifty odd years during which the passport was
issued as a matter of course and was the subject of few judicial inquiries.23
The First World War saw Congress, as in the War of 1812, make it
unlawful to travel abroad without a valid passport. 4 The force of this wartime provision was ended by Joint Resolution on March 3, 1921 and the
7

2

Act of February 28, 1803, ch. 9, § 1, 2 Stat. 205 (1803).

Act of February 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 10, 3 Stat. 199 (1815).
19 Urtetiqui v. D'Arbel, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692 (1835).
20 Id. at 699.
38

21 Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60-61 (1856).
22

Act of May 30, 1866, ch. 102, 14 Stat. 54 (1866). The act provides that passports shall
be issued only to citizens. This provision was amended by 32 Stat. 386 (1902), 22 U.S.C. § 212
(1952) to read:
"No passport shall be granted or issued to or verified for any other persons than those
owing
allegiance, whether citizens or not, to the United States."
23
Miller v. Sinjen, 289 F. 388, 394 (8th Cir. 1923) (issuance of passport declared a discretionary act of Secretary of State) ; Inre Gee Hop, 71 F. 274 (N.D. Cal. 1895) (passport was
declared not valid evidence of citizenship) ; and the cases cited in notes 26 and 27 infra.
24

Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, § 2, 40 Stat. 559 (1918). The provision was in force during

presidential proclamation of emergency. The proclaimed emergency began on August 8, 1918
[Proc. of that date, 40 Stat. 1829 (1918)].
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country returned to its normal condition in which the passport was not
necessary to lawful travel abroad.25
Judicial determinations during the period 1866-1938 contributed no
new thinking on the nature of the power to restrict international travel
except for a single case only indirectly related in its facts .2 The Supreme
Court, considering a power Congress claimed to possess, indicated in 1932
that the power of the United States to limit foreign travel was similar to
the prerogative of the English Sovereign." As has been noted previously,
this power was limited in its use by the English Sovereign. But the comment is significant in recognizing that a power to restrict foreign travel of
some sort exists somewhere in the federal government and exists there
sometimes even in the absence of war-time emergency.
Post 1939: A Right and a Requirement
It was not unlawful to travel abroad without a passport in 1939. The
passport was thought to be a kind of privilege grantable at the free discretion of the Secretary of State-as it had been assumed to be for many years.
But in that year the Supreme Court decided Perkins v. Elg28 and placed
the first of several restraints upon the Secretary's authority in this area.
Where the Secretary had made an erroneous finding of mixed law and fact
relating to the citizenship of a passport applicant, the Court declared that
the Secretary could not refuse to issue a passport solely upon those grounds.
This meant two things: (1) Whether the Secretary did or did not issue the
passport was not something purely discretionary with him; and (2) the
passport, even though it was not essential to lawful international travel at
the time, was recognized as something to which a citizen had some sort of
limited right (viz: the citizen cannot be denied the passport without "due
process of law").
All of the cases which came before the courts, then, prior to the Second
World War really involved whether a citizen would be entitled to a passport or whether a passport was valid evidence of citizenship. And since all
of these cases were tried at times when it was not unlawful to travel abroad
without a passport, the Court had not squarely met the question of whether
a citizen could lawfully be denied his right to travel abroad altogether.
The Second World War resulted in absolute restrictions on lawful foreign travel as had previous wars in which the United States was involved. 9
But in 1947 and following, even in the absence of a "shooting" war, the
Secretary continued his wartime restrictions in effect.3 ° The Secretary's
25

joint Resolution of March 3, 1921, ch. 136, 41 Stat. 1359 (1921).
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932).
27
Id. at 437-38. See also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
28 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
29 See notes 18 and 24 supra. The act which made these restrictions effective was the Act
of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252 (1941).
30 These were the old provisions of 22 U.S.C. §§ 223-26b which were repealed June 27,
1952 [ch.477, Title IV, § 403(a) (15), 66 Stat. 279 (1952)]. The passport requirements contained in these provisions are now found in Subchapter II of Chapter 12 of Title 8, Aliens and
Nationality. See note 32 infra.
26
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position was solidified in January of 1953 when President Harry Truman
invoked"' the provisions of Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality
32
Act of June 27, 1952 (Section 1185) which provides, inter alia,
(a) When the United States is at war or during the existence of any
national emergency proclaimed by the President ...
and the President shall
find that the interests of the United States require that restrictions and
prohibitions in addition to those provided otherwise than by this section
be imposed upon the departure of persons from and their entry into the
United States and shall make public proclamation thereof ....(Emphasis
added.)
(b) After such proclamation... has been made.., it shall be unlawful
for any citizen of the United States to depart from or enter, or attempt to
depart from or enter, the United States unless he bears a valid passport.
Thus it was that the foundation was laid for the collision of the rights
of Messrs. Dayton, Briehl, and Kent with the power of the Secretary of
State.
The ensuing discussion does not concern itself primarily with factors
involved in balancing the conflicting interests of the individual passport
applicant and those of the national government. It will be seen that the
rights of individuals with respect to foreign travel are to be protected in
much the same manner regardless of where in the Government scheme the
power to regulate such travel is found to exist. Therefore, the focus of the
remaining discussion shifts from the effect of the exercise of a power upon
individuals to the effect of the residence of a power upon the nation as a
whole.
The Power to Regulate Travel
The Secretary's power to establish substantive categories of passport
eligibility stems from one of two sources. First, the power may be delegated
to him as a member of the executive branch by Congress. And second, the
power may come to him through the President's exercise of an "inherent"
executive power.
A DelegatedPower?
The congressional provision found in 22 U.S.C. section 211a is entitled: "Authority to grant, issue and verify passports. 38 It reads in part
as follows:
The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports.., under such rules
as the President shall designate and prescribe for and on behalf of the
United States, and no other person shall grant, issue or verify such passports.
31

Proc. No. 3004 of January 17, 1953, 67 Stat. C31 (1953).
Immigration and Nationality Act § 215, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
S344 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1952).
32
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This act does not contemplate the fact that a passport might be essential
to lawful foreign travel since it was enacted at a time when there was no
such requirement.
The provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act dealing with
passport control are the expressions of Congress upon that situation. 4 Section 1185 is a tiny portion of a voluminous legislative effort. The major
purpose of the entire act was the control of aliens entering and leaving the
country. 5 It is logical to assume that the purpose of requiring citizens to
carry passports was to enable port officials and others to identify them with
more certainty than would otherwise be possible.
This view of the provision is supported by the actions of Congress in
1956. Representative Walter introduced legislation which would have provided the Secretary with powers at least as broad as those claimed in the
principal cases. 6 The bill was entitled: "A bill to amend the Administrative Procedure Act37 and the Communist Control Act of 195438 so as to
provide for a passport review procedure and to prohibit the issuance of
passports to persons under Communist discipline." 39 This bill died in committee. It is perhaps arguable that Congress believed it had already delegated substantially this authority in Sections 211a or 1185 or both, and
that no further legislation was needed. But it is certainly not unreasonable
to conclude that when Congress declines the opportunity to provide expressly for what has been previously left to implication, there is some evidence that Congress is not yet clear in its own mind what the proper interpretation of the previous legislation ought to be.
The only other congressional expression in this area of passport power
is found in the Internal Security Act of 1950.4" In part it provides as
follows:
(8) Due to the nature and scope of the world Communist movement...
travel of communist members ... from country to country facilitates communication and is prerequisite for the carrying on of activities to further
the purposes of the Communist movement.
(9) In the United States those individuals who knowingly and wilfully
participate in the world Communist movement, when they so participate,
in effect repudiate their allegiance to the United States....
84 See note 32 supra.
35 See discussion in KANSAS, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY Act 1-20 (4th ed. 1953);
id., Forward
to Fourth Edition by the late Sen. McCarran.
36
H.R. 9991, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) (may be found in 102 CONG. REc. 4844 (1956)).
37 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).
38 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 50 U.S.C. § 782 (1952), as amended, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C.
§ 782 (supp. IV, 1957).
39 Section 13 of the act provides that it shall be unlawful for any officer to issue a passport to certain persons under Communist influence. Section 14 defines the persons covered.
Section 15 provides the penalties.
40 64 Stat. 987, 993 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781, 785 (1952).
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(a) When a Communist Organization 41

...

is registered or there is in

effect a final order of the Board2 requiring such organization to register, it
shall be unlawful for any member of such organization... (1) to make
application for a passport... ; or (2) to use or attempt to use such passport ....

(Emphasis added.)

It will be noted that this act is totally inoperative with respect to restrictions on passports until such organizations have registered or been ordered
to register. The conditions precedent to this act (namely, the registration
of such organizations) had not been realized at the time of the Dayton,
Briehl and Kent cases.4" And since Congress has taken pains to spell out
in detail these Communist control provisions and procedure in this act, it
is strong evidence that Congress did not yet consider itself to have granted
the Secretary those powers.
The interpretation to be given those acts which did purport to delegate
power to the President and Secretary with respect to travel restrictions
presents a more difficult problem of construction.4 4 Certainly, in searching
for help along these lines, deference should be given the President's own
interpretation of his power. But, strangely enough, it is difficult to find any
statement by the President in the form of an executive order which indicates that the President believed the Secretary could be given the power
to establish substantive categories of passport eligibility. For instance:
Executive Order No. 78561 5 put section 211a 46 into effect. It designated
only one genuine category of passport eligibility-citizenship and allegiance.47 The rest of the rules
promulgated at that time were strictly formal
48
requisites of application.
Nor did Proclamation No. 3004, which made operative the provisions
of section 1185," seem to give the Secretary such authority; for, although
the section made a passport a prerequisite of lawful international travel,
it did not alter the past requisites for receiving a passport nor add any new
categories of eligibility. Reading the proclamation in context, the meaning
which it reasonably should be given is that it granted the Secretary the
power to require American citizens to prove their identity when entering
41

Id.
42 Id.

§ 782 provides the statutory definition of "Communist Organization."
§ 791 establishes a five member board, appointed by the President which shall upon

application of the Attorney General determine whether any organization falls within the definitions provided by section 782 and whether any individual is a member of such group. The
registration procedure is provided in section 786. The penalties are outlined in section 794.
43 357 U.S. at 121 n-3.
4444 Stat. 887 (1926), 22 U.S.C. §211a (1952) ; 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
45
Exec. Order No. 7856, 3 Fed. Reg. 799 (1938) redesignated by Dept. Reg. 108.77, 13 Fed.
Reg. 6349 (1948).

46 See note 33 supra.
47
See note 22 supra. 22 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1949) effected the provisions of 22 U.S.C. § 212
(1952).
4822 C.F.R. §§ 51.3-.4 (1949). Sections 51.3-.6 deal with the applications of minors;
sections 51.7-.13, who may be included in one passport; sections 51.14-.17, general requirements
of passports; sections 51.18-.22, names and titles; sections 51.23-.26, contents of applications
for a passport; sections 51.27-.34, amendment of passports.

49 See note 32 supra.
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or leaving their country by means of a passport. There certainly are no
provisions for determining which Americans are to receive passports and
which are not. °
Taken in context then, neither the orders nor proclamations of the
President nor the statutes upon which they were based expressly conveyed
to the Secretary the power to deny a citizen a passport upon a legitimate
request for any reason save citizenship, allegiance, or prior crime."
Narrow Judicial Construction
The right to travel abroad involves the liberty of the individual. This
"liberty" is protected by the fifth amendment of the Constitution. 2 If the
Secretary has the power claimed by him in Dayton, Briehl and Kent, he
has the power to deny a citizen this constitutional privilege. Where statutes
will raise serious constitutional questions if interpreted broadly, it is the
practice of the courts to construe them narrowly.5" With the present cases
the statutes involved will admit reasonably of a narrow construction. Such
a construction seems quite proper since the rights, powers, and immunities
of both sides of this controversy are too important to be jeopardized unnecessarily. This recognition is, perhaps, the strongest argument in situations like these for requiring that Congress speak clearly and unequivocally before recognizing that it has spoken at all.
In the three principal cases the Supreme Court declared that the petitioners were entitled to their passports because the Secretary had not been
delegated the power to refuse to issue them for the reasons he gave. The
Court said: 14
Congress has made no such provision in explicit terms; and absent one,
the Secretary may not employ that standard [to withhold passports to citizens because of their beliefs or associations] to restrict the citizens' right to
free movement.
What the Court did not say is perhaps as important as what it did say in
this regard. First, the Court did not say whether the Secretary's grounds
for refusal bore a "reasonable relation" to the conduct of foreign affairs.55
Second, the Court did not say that Congress could not have given the Secretary a power very similar to the one he claimed. And third, the Court
Cir. 1957).
51 That is: fraud, attempts to escape justice, and applications by persons not owing allegiance to the United States are not "legitimate" in their basis.
52 See 357 U.S. at 129.
53 United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1957); United States v. Rumley,
345 U.S. 41, 48 (1953) ; and on similar reasoning, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
54 357 U.S. at 130. The discussion by Mr. Justice Douglas seems to indicate only that the
Court is refusing to read into section 211a and section 1185 any more than is absolutely necessary. But the tenor of his discussion leaves the impression that if Congress will but steer clear
of a standard based solely upon past associations and beliefs, it can delegate to the Secretary
some sort of power to control the travel of citizens abroad.
55 "Due process of law" requires that all such power bear a "reasonable relation" to proper
legislative or executive purpose. See notes 74 and 75 infra.
50 See Judge Bazelon dissenting in Brichl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561, 581 (D.C.
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gives no indication of the source of this congressional power, if Congress
does possess it.
The Court's reference to the need for congressional expression is strong
and the conclusion would seem to be that such power as the Secretary
claimed is not only not within the "delegated" powers of the President but
is not within the "inherent" powers of that office either. The Court displays
the spirit of its customary technique of "strict necessity" in avoiding discussion of this aspect of the cases. But it may prove profitable to consider
the question here.
An Inherent Power?
Professor Corwin in his work, The President: Office and Powers,
states: 56
... [T] he power of the National Government in the diplomatic sphere,

which is susceptible of limitation by the Constitution when the restrictions
which it imposes upon all power apply, is an inherent power, one which
owes its existence to the fact that the American People are a sovereign entity at internationallaw.
There would seem three possible sources of such a power. First, the
power could arise as an incident of the nation's sovereignty at international
law as Professor Corwin suggests. Or, it may have been inherited from the
Crown of England by the Colonies acting as a unit.5" Or lastly, it may have
been passed to the federal government by the states at the time the Constitution was ratified. s But whichever view is taken the result is the same:
the power exists in the federal government even in the absence of express
delegation by the Constitution.
Assuming that such "inherent" power resides somewhere in the federal
government, the passport cases present the narrower issue of whether the
authority to restrict foreign travel resides initially with the Congress or
is "inherently" the executive's.
Early in the nation's history, Hamilton's theory was that the executive
had all powers in the field of international relations not vested elsewhere
by the Constitution.59 Madison, at the prompting of Jefferson, took issue
with this view. He argued that the powers of foreign policy belonged to
Congress by virtue of its power to declare war. In such a view the President
would be no more than an "instrument" of the Congress in foreign affairs60
The dispute has never been adequately settled.
It has been urged that the President holds a power in this particular
area similar to the English Sovereign's writ of Ne Exeat Regnum. With reference to the field of international affairs, however, the argument is not as
GOCORWIN, TnE PREsIOrNT: OMcE Am POWERs 210 (3d ed. 1948).
57

See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936).
Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 DalIl.) 54, 80-81, 91-95 (1795).
59 CORWIN, op. dt. supra note 56, at 218-19.

58

60Id. at 219.
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strong as it might seem. This power of the English King was not a part of
his foreign affairs prerogative. It was part of the domestic prerogative
having to do with military affairs if we are to believe Blackstone. 61 The
domestic powers of the United States are delegated in large part to Congress in areas such as these. If the power is to be declared "inherent" in the
president, it must not be found to have been delegated to Congress by the
Constitution.
Exercise of the Executive Power
Historically the President has assumed certain exclusive prerogatives.
The President is acknowledged as the sole organ of communication between the foreign powers and the United States.62 Treaties and agreements
form the "contracts" of nations and are the chief means of providing what
little certainty and predictability there is in international relations. The
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, makes the Treaties.
The President without the advice of anyone (in a manner of speaking)
makes and binds the United States in dealings with foreign powers through
executive agreements.6 3 In international politics military force and threats
of military force are key instruments of diplomacy. The President is Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy.
In this regard Professor Corwin says:64
• . . [TIhere is no more securely established principle of constitutional
practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation's intermediary in its dealing with other nations.
In 1937, for example, an action by the United States as assignee of the
Soviet Government to recover a deposit of money once the property of an
extinct Russian Corporation was held by the Supreme Court to be authorized by virtue of the President being the sole organ of international relations of the United States.6"
In so deciding the Supreme Court followed the precedent it set a year
earlier in the case of Curtiss-Wright Export Co. v. United States. In that
case the Court declared:66

It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an
authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but
with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power
of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations ....

(Emphasis added.)

In 1952 Justice Jackson, concurring with the decision made in the Steel
61 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *252, *262, *265.
62 CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 273.
63

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 56, at 224.
65 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
64

66 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936).
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Seizure Case6" which limited the internalpower of the President
in the ab68
sence of delegation from Congress, said of Curtiss-Wright:
That case does not solve the present controversy. It recognized internal
and external affairs as being in separate categories, and held that the strict
limitation upon congressional delegations of power to the President over
internal affairs does not apply with respect to delegations of power in
external affairs. It was intimated that the President might act in external
affairs without congressional authority ....
It is during periods of armed conflict that international affairs become
most important to the nation. At these times the inherent powers of the
President are exercised in extraordinary fashion. 69 In the principal cases,
the Court refuses to consider the powers of the Secretary in the light of
war-time conditions. 70 This seems quite proper. But peace and war are
labels which are applied to conditions after they exist. The practical significance and importance of executive powers to the nation at this particular time in world history is that they may be exercised with vigor in the
avoidance of war as well as during its progress. The President should not
be allowed to exercise in any manner a power which he does not properly
possess. 71 But the idea that the exigencies of war can create in the President extraordinary powers which he had not previously in any form is both
unreasonable and unrealistic. "Emergency," per se, cannot be a source of
authority. The demands of war may significantly alter the manner of exercising powers already recognized to exist within the executive, but they
ought never be said to have created those powers. That an "emergency"
calls forth previously non-exercisable authority within the executive is not
to say that such authority had no potential or latent existence within the
executive prior to that calling. The source and present disposition of the
power must be ascertained, it cannot be allowed to waiver about in the
hands of a fictitious creature called "emergency."
In the light of this analysis the important question of the principal
cases is not whether the President through the office of the Secretary of
State was justified in refusing the passports to Mr. Dayton, Dr. Briehl, and
Mr. Kent in view of the existing emergency. The question is whether or not
he had the power to establish substantive categories of persons eligible for
lawful travel abroad under any circumstancesin the absence of an express
delegation of such authority from the Congress. And the Supreme Court
may have decided that latter issue in the negative.
In analyzing the significance of such a declaration (that the power to
67 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6
8M. at 635 n.2.
69

Madson v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) ; Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946);

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93
(1943).
70357 U.S. at 128.
71
The fact that Congress may render the question of the legality of the President's conduct
moot by subsequent ratification should not affect this policy.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 10

restrict the foreign travel of citizens is not inherently the President's) the
picture must not be clouded by considerations of "due process." Nevertheless, to see why such factors are irrelevant, it will be well to review, briefly,
the nature of the "due process" protections.
Executive Power and "Due Process of Law"
It is well understood that the constitution does not recognize any absolute liberty which is uncontrollable in every sense. Constant threats to the
health, morals, safety, and welfare of the social organization require that
every personal liberty be modified by the exigencies of group need.72 This
is not contested. What is forbidden in this country is not the deprivation of
liberty, but the deprivation of liberty without "due process of law." 73 In
broad terms "due process" has come to require that the particular law or
power shall be exercised in a manner which is not "unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious." 74 And the courts have long stood as interpreters of
what is "arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose within
75
the competency of the State to effect."1
If the President of the United States has the power to control the travel
of American citizens as an effective instrument of foreign policy, he will
most certainly not have the power to act in a capricious and arbitrary manner-in violation of due process. It is true that many areas of foreign
relations are considered free of judicial interference. The determination
of the nature of treaty obligations," the recognition of governments,7 7 and
even the designation of international air routes"8 have been held not justiciable. Similar handling has been given the question of the authority to
control the exclusion, expulsion, and, in times of emergency, the property
of aliens. 7 But a passport is not purely a political document."0
The control over passports is closely allied to-indeed a part of-the
conduct of foreign affairs. That is why it should be considered part of the
President's inherent power. But, since it involves a denial of personal liberty as well, it must be recognized as subject to requirements of substantive as well as procedural due process.81
In short, "due process" stands as a backdrop of protection to the individual citizen regardless of where the power under consideration is found
72 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
73 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) ; in the lower court, 183 F.2d 201,
212 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531-32 (1945).
74

Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1934).
75 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
76

Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942).
78 Chicago & So. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
79 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587-90 (1952) ; United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
80
Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F.2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
81 225 F.2d at 940.
77
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to reside. The effect on applicants for passports is apt to be the same
whether the power to restrain lawful foreign travel altogether is found to
reside in Congress subject to delegation or "inherently" with the executive
as an incident to the power to conduct the nation's foreign relations.
In any discussion of whether a particular activity involves the "conduct of foreign relations" close attention must be paid to the consequences
of the activity sought to be controlled. And, in this regard, it should be
apparent from even the most brief survey of the present international
scene that the presence of American citizens in different parts of the world
may be a significant factor in the conduct of foreign relations. As citizens
differ in backgrounds and personalities, so will the effects of their particular presences differ as they travel from place to place in the world. The
consequences of a particular individual's travel among foreign persons may
be insignificant to the nation's international interests or such travel may
be extremely serious depending upon the circumstances, but such travel
will always be a factor of some effect.
Domestic Power and the Conduct of ForeignAffairs
In these recent passport cases, the Supreme Court declared:, 2
... [The passport's] crucial function today is control over exit. And, as
we have seen, the right of exit is a personal right included within the word
"liberty" as used in the Fifth Amendment. If that "liberty" is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the law-making functions of the Congress.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer .... (Emphasis added.)
Youngstown 83 dealt with the President's claim to an "inherent" domestic power and was distinguished from the external power questions
84
involved in Curtiss-Wright.
The authority involved in the principal cases is clearly an authority to
control international travel. International travel is an important political
factor in modern international relations. The Court declares that the authority to control foreign travel by passport denials at this time in history
is predominantly a "domestic" power and is, therefore, properly within
the law-making authority of Congress. The Court admits that if a "political question entrusted to the Chief Executive by the Constitution" were
involved the case would be different."' But since personal liberty is to be
regulated, the power must be said to reside initially with Congress.
Several things are apparent. To say that whenever the personal liberty
of a citizen is denied by the exercise of a power, the power becomes ipso
facto "domestic" is to err. The concepts of "foreign relations" and "individual liberty" are not mutually exclusive. If a power is one essentially
involving foreign affairs, it remains so although the rights of individuals
are involved in its exercise.
82

357 U.S. at 129.

83 The Steel Seizure Case. See notes 67 and 68 supra.
84

See notes 66 and 68 supra.

85 357 U.S. at 129.
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It must be concluded that when the Court says that a power acknowledged to be a significant factor in foreign relations is not exercisable by
the Chief Executive in the absence of congressional delegation, it must be
declaring, in reality, that the power's exercise at this time and under these
circumstances bears no "reasonable relation" to the conduct of foreign
affairs. This is tantamount to saying that the President would, in exercising
this power, be denying "due process" to the passport applicants in the
principal cases."
Such decisions are serious constitutional declarations. Serious not so
much to individuals (who are protected by "due process" in either case) as
to the country as a whole which finds its chief diplomat deprived of an
important instrument of foreign diplomacy.
Conclusion
This discussion has described how three men, seeking passports in order
to travel to diverse foreign destinations, involved the country's highest
court in another exercise in balancing the interests of the individual with
those of the state. It was seen that the problem, substantially, was one of
first impression for the Court; the reason being that absolute restrictions
on international travel were foreign to this country in times of "peace"
prior to the end of World War II.
The sources of the Secretary's power to so restrict travel could only
have been two: either he was delegated the power by Congress or the power
was one "inherently" the President's. That the power to establish categories of passport eligibility had been "delegated" to the President or Secretary was difficult to establish. There was no quarrel with the Court's
declaration that such power had not in fact been given by the Congress.
But the question of whether the power was "inherent" in the President
as incident to the conduct of foreign affairs (an area peculiarly within the
province of the executive) presented a more complicated picture. The difficulty seems one of keeping decisions regarding what constitutes the proper
exercise of a power separate from considerations of where a power resides
initially.
The Court was understandably anxious to avoid the adjudication of a
serious constitutional question involving the personal liberty of a citizen.
But in its decision it has necessarily declared upon an equally serious constitutional question involving the basic distribution of powers within the
national government. For this reason, clarification of issues and adroit separation of superficially similar but fundamentally different problems would
seem the order of the day for any decision of this kind-especially for those
involving the defensive posture of the nation in international politics.
Notwithstanding this need, the Court in the cases which Mr. Dayton,
Dr. Briehl, and Mr. Kent brought before it announced that the President
had not this particular control over foreign travel in the absence of an express delegation from Congress. The Court could not be saying that the
86 See Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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only regulation of individual "liberty"--of any kind-which the Constitution admits of must spring forth "pursuant to the law-making functions"
of the Congress. Such a notion would be patently erroneous.
Therefore, the Court was declaring either that the authority to control
the foreign travel of citizens was so essentially a "domestic" function that
it could not be recognized as ever falling within the inherent powers of the
President or it was saying that his actions in these cases were, in the absence of war, not a proper exercise of his admitted "inherent" powers over
the nation's foreign affairs. The former alternative seems highly unrealistic.
The Supreme Court is shouldered with responsibilities far wider than
the demands of any particular case. The Court not only declares the supreme law of the land but, for practical purposes, it defines the authority
of the federal government. And it is not an exaggeration to say that that
government may be, in times like these, all that stands between the citizen
and foreign domination. Therefore, where the avoidance of a declaration
of law results necessarily, by implication, in an authoritative definition of
the powers of a branch of government, the Court ought to choose a path
which will shed the greatest possible light on the issue actually decided. In
the long run decisions made by positive declaration, even if resting upon
concepts not fully explored, are apt to be more beneficial to all concerned
than any practice which leaves vital issues to be answered by negative
implication alone.
Nevertheless, the Court in these most recent passport cases declined to
make precise definitions of the "emergency" or the "inherent" powers of
the executive. Opportunities for authoritative delineation of these powers
are likely to arise more frequently in coming years. It is to be hoped that the
Supreme Court of the land will not for long refrain from expressing itself
clearly and positively in this increasingly vital area of constitutional law.

